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The mission of the Independence Standards Board (ISB
or Board) is to establish independence standards
applicable to the audits of public entities in order to
serve the public interest and to protect and promote
investors’ confidence in the securities markets. Two of
the founding precepts of the ISB are that (1) while many
factors may affect the functioning of the capital markets,
those markets will not function effectively unless
investors have confidence in the information they use to
make investment decisions, and (2) an independent
audit is essential to providing that sense of confidence.
If knowledgeable and reasonable investors believed that
the independent auditor placed the interests of the
accounting firm, the audit client, or any other person,
over the interests of investors, then the value of the audit
function would be impaired.
With this mission in mind, and while working
concurrently on its project to establish a conceptual
framework for auditor independence to serve as a
foundation for principles-based independence standards,
the Board has studied certain independence concerns
related to audit firm personnel going to work for firm
audit clients. The Board seeks comment on its proposal,
as described in this Exposure Draft (ED), that firms
implement certain policies and procedures to follow
(safeguards) when a firm professional goes to work for an
audit client shortly after leaving the firm.
The operating policies of the ISB are designed to permit
timely, thorough and open study of issues involving
auditor independence, and to encourage broad public
participation in the process of establishing and
improving independence standards. All of the ISB’s
constituencies, including members of the public, are
1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036-8775
(212) 596-6133 . fax (212) 596-6137
Web site: www.cpaindependence.org

encouraged to express their views on matters under
consideration in order to stimulate constructive public
dialogue.
The ISB is seeking specific input on the questions posed
at the end of this ED. In addition, we welcome
comments and suggestions on any other aspects of this
proposal.
Any individual or organization may obtain one copy of
this Exposure Draft (ED 99-2), without charge, by
contacting the ISB. The ED is also available on the ISB
website at www.cpaindependence.org.

Your responses, which must be received by February 29,
2000, may be sent via:
1. mail

2. fax
3. e-mail

Independence Standards Board
6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
(212)596-6137
isb@cpaindependence.org

Please reference ED 99-2 in your correspondence.
All responses will be available for public inspection and
copying for one year at the offices of the Independence
Standards Board and also at the library of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA),
Harborside Financial Center, 201 Plaza Three, Jersey
City, New Jersey.
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Proposed Independence Standard

Employment with Audit Clients

BACKGROUND
1. The Board began to study the independence implications of audit firm
professionals going to work for the firm's audit clients shortly after its
formation. After determining that guidance was needed in these situations, the
Board began the process of developing a standard concurrent with its work on a
conceptual framework for auditor independence.

2.
A Discussion Memorandum (DM 99-1, Employment with Audit Clients)
covering the issues was prepared by the Staff with the assistance of a broad
based project task force consisting of representatives from the investor,
preparer, academic, and regulator communities, in addition to members of the
profession. The DM was released in March for a 90-day comment period.
Comment from investors was specifically sought; the DM was mailed to several
investor organizations and to 370 institutional investors in an effort to
encourage responses from that constituency. Twenty-eight comment letters
were received. After considering these letters, and with further assistance from
the project task force, the Board developed this proposed standard for public
comment.

THREATS TO INDEPENDENCE

3.
The concerns expressed when professionals leave firms to join audit clients
are generally threefold:
a.
That members of the audit team, who may have been friendly with, or
respectful of a former partner or professional when he or she was with the
firm, would be reluctant to challenge the decisions of the former partner or
professional and, as a result, might accept the client’s proposed
accounting without exercising appropriate skepticism or maintaining
proper objectivity.
b.
In situations where partners or other audit team members resign to
accept positions with audit clients, questions may be raised regarding
whether the individuals exercised an appropriate level of skepticism during
the audit process prior to their departure.
c.
That the departing partner or professional may be familiar enough
with the audit approach and testing strategy so as to be able to circumvent
its design.
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4.
The perceived threats to auditor independence when the former partner or
professional has retirement benefits or a capital account with the accounting
firm are that such a financial interest:
a.
May create the appearance that ties between the audit firm and the
partner / professional have not been severed - that the firm has placed its
“own man” (or woman) at the client, functioning as management, and is in
effect auditing the results of its own work.

b.
If the former partner or professional’s retirement benefits vary based
on the firm’s profits, then the former partner or professional may be
inclined to pay the firm higher fees to inflate his or her retirement benefits
(or to increase the likelihood of receiving benefits in unfunded plans). As a
result, the firm may be less rigorous in its scrutiny of the client’s
accounting policies because its fees are overly rich.
c.
If the former partner or professional’s unfunded retirement benefits or
other monies held by the firm are material to the firm, and / or the firm is
experiencing cash flow problems, and the former partner or professional
has the right to call for settlement of these balances, the firm may be less
rigorous in its scrutiny of the client’s accounting policies in exchange for
forbearance on the amounts owed to the former partner or professional.

PROPOSED STANDARD

Applicability
5.
The provisions of this standard apply to a firm when one or more of its
professionals joins an audit client. This standard does not apply when a former
firm professional joins the board of directors of a firm audit client as a non
executive director.

Standard

6.
To maintain its independence with respect to an audit client subject to the
auditor independence requirements of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), a firm must employ the following policies and procedures
(safeguards) when a firm professional joins such an audit client within one year
of leaving the firm. These policies and procedures would be adapted as
described below depending on:

a.
the position of the departing professional at the audit firm;
b.
the circumstances surrounding the professional’s departure from
the firm (i.e., retirement, versus termination, or voluntary withdrawal);
c.
the position he or she is taking at the client;
d.
the length of time that has elapsed since the professional left the
firm;
4

e.
whether the professional served as a member of the audit team, and
the length of time that has elapsed since the professional performed
services related to the audit engagement; and
f.
other facts and circumstances that would heighten or mitigate
threats to audit independence.

Required Safeguards

7.
Firms shall have formal policies requiring firm professionals participating
in an audit engagement to immediately notify the managing partner (or his or
her designee) in any situation involving potential employment considerations or
negotiations with the audit client, and the individual must immediately be
removed from the engagement. Any audit procedures performed prior to this
time shall be promptly documented in a separate memorandum, if not already
evident in the working papers. Firms shall periodically remind professionals of
these independence requirements concerning job negotiations.
8.
When a professional accepts employment with an audit client after
participating in the current or the prior year audit, the engagement partner or
his or her designee shall ensure that the audit work performed by such a
professional in the most current audit was performed with objectivity and
impartiality by having someone at least one level higher than the departing
professional review such work. If the professional joining the client is the
engagement partner, the managing partner or his or her designee shall assign a
partner not involved with the engagement team to perform an in-depth review of
the previously issued audit report, financial statements, and working papers
together with all audit work for the current year either performed or reviewed by
the departing partner (an “in-depth review”). This review shall take place as
soon as possible after the individual announces the intention to join the audit
client.

9.
Firms shall address the concern that there may be situations where the
departing partner or professional is familiar enough with the firm’s general
audit approach, or the planned audit approach and testing strategy for the
particular company, so as to be able to circumvent their design, if desired. For
example, specific locations for inventory counts or other test work may have
already been selected, or areas of audit emphasis may have already been
decided, prior to the professional’s departure. The new engagement team shall
review the audit plan and strategy to determine the risk of circumvention, make
modifications as deemed necessary, and maintain a heightened sense of
awareness during the audit for the threat of circumvention.
10. Firms shall also address the concern that the remaining audit team
members, because of their past relationship with the professional now in a
position of responsibility with the client, may be reluctant to challenge the
decisions or positions taken by the former partner or other professional. The
magnitude of these concerns will depend upon the position of the departing
professional, the nature of the relationship the person had with remaining audit
team members, the nature of the position being assumed at the client, and the
degree of interaction the former partner or professional is expected to have with
5

the remaining engagement team. The managing partner (or his or her designee)
shall review the relationships between the former partner or professional and
the remaining engagement members, and replace engagement team members
who may have too close a relationship with the former partner or professional
accepting a responsible position at the client where he or she will interact with
the audit team.

11. Similarly, in situations where a prominent partner joins an audit client in
a position where he or she will interact with the auditors, the managing partner
shall review the appropriateness of the assigned engagement and concurring
review partners, and consider the need to involve other partners with
appropriate experience and stature to ensure that the necessary level of
professional skepticism is maintained. The concern here is that a less
experienced engagement team may be unduly influenced by the statements of,
for example, a former industry leader or senior technical partner of their firm.
12. In addition, if the departing professional will have significant interaction
with the audit team, the next annual audit following the professional’s
acceptance of employment shall be subjected to review either prior to report
issuance, or under the firm’s next annual inspection procedures, with a view
towards monitoring compliance with policies related to independence, integrity,
objectivity, and engagement performance. The purpose of this review is to
determine whether the remaining engagement team maintained the requisite
skepticism when evaluating the representations of a former firm professional.

13. The safeguards outlined above shall be adapted to fit the facts and
circumstances. For example, if the tax partner assigned to the engagement left
to join the client, another tax partner should review the former tax partner’s
work; the entire engagement would not have to be reviewed. If the departing
firm professional was not involved in providing audit services to the client, then
of course there is no audit work performed by the professional to review;
however, procedures related to assessing the departing professional’s
relationship with the audit team, or his or her familiarity with the audit
process, may be applicable.
14. Firms that are members of an established peer review program, such as
that offered by the AICPA's SEC Practice Section, shall ensure that the scope of
the peer review performed includes an evaluation of the firm's compliance with
the provisions of this Standard. This would also require an assessment of the
effectiveness with which safeguards were implemented by reviewing all or, if
agreed to by an independent party overseeing the peer review program (such as
the Public Oversight Board), a sample of the audit engagements subject to this
Standard. Firms whose audit practices are not subject to at least tri-annual
peer review must, at least every three years, engage an independent practitioner
to assess compliance with these requirements and to issue a report on the
results of that assessment.
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15. When a former firm partner joins a firm audit client, all capital balances
and similar financial interests between the firm and the former partner 1 must
be settled in full regardless of the amount of time that has elapsed since the
partner left the firm. In addition, retirement benefits must be settled in full 2
whenever:
a.
a partner joins an audit client within two years of his or her
departure from the firm; or
b.
when benefits are not both de minimus to the firm and fixed as to
amount due and expected timing of payment.
These requirements apply regardless of whether the former firm partner was
previously involved in the audit engagement.

16. When a firm professional other than a partner leaves to join a firm audit
client, all retirement balances and other financial interests that are not both de
minimus to the firm, and fixed as to amount and timing of payment, must be
fully settled. In addition, the firm shall also consider whether retirement
benefits and other financial interests should be settled when a former firm
professional (non-partner) joins an audit client within two years of leaving the
firm, based on the position that the professional has accepted at the client.
This analysis shall include an assessment of the level of responsibility that the
former firm professional is assuming, and the degree of involvement the former
professional will have with the audit team and the audit engagement. These
requirements apply regardless of whether the former firm professional was
previously involved in the audit engagement.
17. Finally, firms shall consider, depending on such factors as the level of the
professional while he or she was with the firm, the degree of involvement he or
she had with the audit engagement, and the position taken at the client,
whether the employment situation should be discussed with the audit
committee in accordance with ISB Standard No. 1, Independence Discussions
with Audit Committees.

1 a partner’s equity interest in the firm or contribution to working capital; loans to or from the firm; loans
guaranteed by the firm on behalf of the partner and vice versa; etc.
2 In the United States, the payment of retirement benefits to the individual would immediately subject such
benefits to income taxes. In some cases, this tax liability can be deferred by transferring retirement benefits
to an Individual Retirement Account or similar vehicle, in which case the amounts become taxable only
when paid to the beneficiary. In other cases, the amount can be transferred to a "Rabbi Trust" which also
serves to defer such income taxes. A Rabbi Trust is an irrevocable trust whose assets are not accessible to
the company until all benefit obligations have been met; however, such assets are subject to the claims of
creditors in the event of the company’s bankruptcy or insolvency. To meet the requirements of this
standard regarding settlement of retirement balances, such a trust can only be used if the amounts are not
material to the firm, they are fixed as to amount and timing of payment (i.e., the benefits do not fluctuate
based on firm results, and the present value of benefits due to the departing professional can be calculated
and placed in the trust), and the bankruptcy of the firm is considered remote.
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Effective Date
18. The above requirements are effective when former firm professionals join
audit clients after June 30, 2000, with earlier application encouraged.

BASIS FOR CONCLUSIONS
19. The Board’s desire is to provide clear guidance that will protect the quality
and integrity of audited financial statements for the ultimate benefit of investors
and other users of those statements. To accomplish this goal, the Board
weighed a variety of factors, some of which are described below, in determining
the best approach to address the threats to auditor independence posed by
situations where firm professionals join audit clients.

Effectiveness of Safeguards
20. The Board believes that the safeguards mandated by this standard will
effectively protect auditor independence in situations where firm professionals
go to work for their audit clients. A requirement to review an individual’s work
after the announcement that he or she is joining the audit client, and, when
appropriate, of reviewing the engagement team’s work on the subsequent audit,
is expected to have a deterrent effect. The expectation is that professionals who
are broadly evaluating their career options will be more careful to ensure that
the work performed and the decisions made during the audit engagement are
above criticism, if they know that the work will be subject to a special review if
they leave the firm and join the client. In addition, the skepticism of the
remaining engagement team when evaluating the statements of a former
colleague or leader may be higher if a special review of the current engagement
were certain; knowing that their work will be reviewed, individuals will most
likely be more sensitive or aware of appearing to have acquiesced to a client’s
aggressive or incorrect accounting, and will be more likely to refrain from doing
so.

21. Open discussion of employment of audit firm professionals situations with
the audit committee or board of directors can also serve as an effective
safeguard. Airing, “in the sunshine,” the potential threats to independence
posed by these situations, and the safeguards employed by the firm to protect
auditor independence, is likely to sensitize those involved (both the former firm
professional now with the company and the remaining audit team) to these
issues, and make independence impairments less likely. In addition, while
auditors are responsible for upholding their own professional standards,
including those related to independence, the audit committee can “set the tone
at the top,” and emphasize the proper separation between management and the
auditor. The Board believes that effective corporate governance can play an
important role in protecting auditor independence.
22. In developing the standard, the Board allowed for flexibility in adapting the
safeguards to the facts and circumstances of the employment situation. The
Board believes, for example, that the concerns one would have when a partner
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leaves a firm to join a client would exist, but to a lesser extent, when
professionals with lower levels of responsibility leave and go to clients. These
concerns would also presumably vary depending on the nature and level of new
responsibilities assumed by the departing professional at the client. In
addition, the issues may vary for active versus retired partners and other
professionals, those leaving the firm voluntarily versus those terminated, and
engagement professionals versus firm professionals having little or no direct
prior professional relationship with the client. Therefore, the Board believes
that an effective standard must be sufficiently flexible to contemplate a variety
of situations, especially as the structure of the firms change, and more
professionals are given new responsible, non-partner roles in firms.

23. The proposed requirements call for a review in some circumstances, prior
to report issuance or under the firm’s annual inspection procedures, of the next
annual audit following the professional’s acceptance of employment. Some
questioned whether such a review, meant to determine whether the engagement
team had an appropriate level of skepticism, might be more effective if
performed prior to the firm’s “sign-off’ on the audit. The Board believes that the
primary benefit of the review is its deterrent effect. That is, members of the
audit team, knowing that their work will be subject to an additional in-depth
review, will be less likely to acquiesce to questionable client proposals. It also
believes that mandating such an in-depth review prior to issuance of the audit
report would often result in deferring for a significant period of time release of
the audited financial statements. Such a delay could impose a significant cost
to users of financial statements and the Board did not consider the additional
benefits, if any, of a pre-issuance review to justify such costs.

Settlement of Financial Interests

24. With regard to the settlement of financial interests between the firm and
the departing professional, the Board considered the necessity of a “full-payout”
requirement in situations where capital account and retirement balances are de
minimus to the firm, and fixed as to amount and timing of payment. It
concluded that the nature of capital accounts is different from retirement
obligations, and that the firm prior to the employment of the professional by the
audit client must liquidate all capital accounts. The Board believes that a
former partner of the audit firm who is employed by an audit client should not
remain an equity investee in the firm.
25. With respect to retirement obligations, the Board concluded that such
obligations must also be liquidated prior to employment when partners join
audit clients within two years of their departure from the firm, and in all
situations where the benefits are not de minimus to the firm, and fixed as to
amount and timing of payment. However, because they are of a different
character, the Board concluded that liquidation of retirement balances could be
done through a "Rabbi Trust" or similar vehicle (certain funded retirement
obligations could also be settled by transferring the funds to another retirement
fund not associated with the firm, such as an Individual Retirement Account).

9

26. Some expressed concern that a former firm partner could join a large,
multinational audit client several years after leaving the firm, perhaps at a
subsidiary outside of the U.S. In these circumstances, it is possible that the
firm would not be aware of the former partner’s new position at the audit client,
and may not have settled capital balances. The Board does not intend that an
inadvertent and isolated failure to comply with the “full pay-out” provision be
deemed an impairment of independence. It does expect, however, that firms
will impose conditions on former partners and other professionals who have
remaining capital accounts with the firm. One of those conditions should be to
advise the firm when they are contemplating a change in employment, to
ensure that if the new employer is an audit client, the firm will be able to
comply with the provisions of this standard. Furthermore, any inadvertent
failures to comply must be corrected as soon as identified.
27. The Board also considered making several distinctions, suggested by
respondents to the discussion memo, in determining when standards should
require a full-payout of retirement benefits. These respondents suggested that
a full payout requirement distinguish between defined contribution plan
benefits and defined benefit plan benefits, fully funded benefits versus
unfunded amounts, fixed benefits versus those that vary based on profits, and
other criteria. The Board concluded that benefits which are other than de
minimus to the firm, or that vary based on, for example, firm profitability, must
always be settled when a former firm professional accepts a position at an audit
client, regardless of the amount of time that has elapsed since his or her
departure from the firm.
28. The Board does not believe that other retirement balances owed to a
former partner, regardless of their nature, are likely to impinge on auditor
independence, but recognizes that unsettled amounts may present an
“appearance” concern when a partner has recently left the firm to join an audit
client. Therefore, the Board concluded that standards should require full
settlement of these retirement benefits when former partners join firm audit
clients within two years of leaving the firm.

29. The Board believes that the appearance concern discussed above may also
exist when other firm professionals join audit clients within a similar time
frame in high-level positions, particularly where they will interact with the audit
team. The Board concluded, however, that the standard should allow the firms
to determine when retirement balances should be settled in these
circumstances, as it would be difficult to specify the professionals and positions
assumed at the client covered by a full-payout provision.

The Board’s Consideration of a Mandated Cooling-Off Period

30. In studying these issues, the Board considered and rejected a mandated
“cooling-off period” - a prohibition against companies hiring from their audit
firms, or a rule deeming an impairment of the firm’s independence when certain
firm professionals join an audit client. The Board concluded that it would be
difficult, from a legal standpoint, to prohibit a company from hiring someone,
and in any event, it wasn’t necessary to protect auditor independence. The
10

Board also rejected the second method of imposing a cooling-off period,
concluding that the costs of a mandated independence impairment exceeded its
benefits.

31. The Board considered the practicalities of implementing a cooling-off
approach and was concerned about them. A cooling-off approach would mean
either deeming independence to be impaired if any firm professional accepted
an employment offer from an audit client, or specifying which types of persons
would be included in such a rule and which would not. The former course
seemed unnecessary, and the latter very complex or arbitrary, since the types of
individuals who might represent threats would presumably depend upon their
positions in the firm, their roles in the audit, and the positions they would be
assuming at the audit client. Generalizing when that combination might
constitute a threat to auditor independence and when it would not seemed to be
a daunting task which should not be undertaken if an effective alternative were
available.

32. The Board believes that with the appropriate safeguards in place, as called
for by this Standard, the threats to auditor independence are slight. In
addition, the Board believes that the benefits to society and the profession of
allowing firm professionals to accept employment with audit clients, without
fear of jeopardizing their former firm’s independence, outweigh the costs. In
reaching this conclusion, the Board recognizes that a mandatory cooling-off
period may promote the appearance of independence more completely, and
might eliminate the risk that the audit team could be unduly influenced by a
former colleague, but it believes the differences in actual threats to
independence under the two approaches are insignificant.
33. The Board recognizes that the attraction of future employment
opportunities draws talented and ambitious recruits to the profession.
Turnover at public accounting firms can be quite high, and many recruits do
not intend to stay long enough to be promoted to partner. Furthermore, they
join public accounting firms because of the broad experience they expect to gain
at the firm, and the contacts they expect to make in industry. In addition,
turnover within the partner ranks has increased in the last few years. If the
future employment prospects of recruits and experienced auditors now working
for audit firms were limited by a mandated cooling-off period, the Board was
concerned that the caliber of professional attracted to public accounting might
decline.
34. In addition, the Board agreed with several corporate officials and others
responding to the discussion memo who argued that companies benefit from
the ability to hire staff at all levels from their audit team. An auditor who has
worked for several years on an engagement is often thoroughly familiar with the
company’s systems, and knows most of the company’s key people and their
responsibilities. Beyond familiarity with the hiring company, the auditor brings
broad experience “to the table” from working at a variety of companies, and
sometimes in a variety of industries. In addition, partners and professionals in
public accounting firms are generally recognized as experts in accounting,
financial reporting, and internal control matters - skills needed by companies
with financial reporting responsibilities to investors.
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35. A mandated cooling-off period might force a company to choose between
its audit partner and its audit firm, knowing that if the partner were hired, the
audit firm would have to be replaced. The Board recognizes that replacement of
an audit firm carries costs to firms, companies, and investors. There is a
learning curve on a first year audit; auditors spend significantly more time and
resources on them (developing audit programs, familiarizing themselves with
the system of internal controls, etc.), and company personnel spend more time
answering the auditors’ questions and producing documentation previously
provided to the prior auditors. And because the Board believes that audits are
strengthened by institutional continuity, rotation of auditors and the increased
risk that the first-year audit poses carries a cost to investors.
36. The Board acknowledges the counter-argument that a fresh look by a new
audit team may carry some benefits that cannot be achieved with the same
audit team and approach year after year. The consideration of a requirement
that companies change audit firms periodically, however, is well beyond the
scope of this project.
37. The Board also concluded that a restriction on hiring former engagement
partners or other professionals may be a heavier burden to smaller corporations
in need of the accounting expertise provided by someone familiar with their
business and industry, and to smaller firms. Smaller corporations may be at a
disadvantage in recruiting personnel when competing with larger companies
with strong national or regional name-recognition. Restricting these smaller
companies from hiring directly from their audit firm (from among those who
know the company well) may hurt them disproportionately.
38. Personnel from smaller accounting firms may face the same difficulties
when competing in the job market with people from large, well-known firms. A
rule that impairs the ability to go from an audit firm directly to a client, where
management knows you and you have had a chance to demonstrate your
abilities, may be more of a burden if you work for a smaller firm.
39. Finally, the Board concluded that a mandatory cooling-off period would be
ineffective in preventing fraud or collusion between the auditor and client. If
the firm professional and company management were intent on committing
fraud, the professional may remain with the firm rather than risk turning the
engagement over to another individual who may uncover the conspiracy. In
addition, if management wanted to compensate a firm professional for his or
her role in a fraud, a ban on hiring the professional for a certain period of time
may not prevent the company from providing payments to the professional,
after he or she resigns from the firm, via consulting contracts or other means.

Other Matters

40. The Board concluded that the threats to auditor independence described
in this standard are not normally relevant when former firm professionals
assume positions as non-executive directors - members of the Board of
Directors who do not also serve in a management capacity. Furthermore, such
12

directors are not employees; therefore, the requirements of this standard do not
apply in these situations. Existing rules cover these situations and remain in
effect.

QUESTIONS FOR RESPONDENTS
Q1.
Rather than restricting the scope of the proposed standard to an
arbitrary group of professionals joining audit clients in particular positions
(e.g., partners joining audit clients in responsible financial reporting positions),
the standard recognizes that the threats to auditor independence identified
apply in differing degrees to a wide variety of professionals in a wide variety of
situations. Therefore, the standard covers all firm professionals leaving to join
firm audit clients, and provides criteria to use in adapting the specified
safeguards to the facts and circumstances of the situation. Considering the
need to apply judgment to comply with the Standard, are its requirements
sufficiently clear?

Q2.
The SEC Practice Section’s membership, and therefore, its peer review
program, do not include firms operating outside of the United States, even
those affiliated with U.S. firms. And while peer review programs have been
adopted in certain other countries, their use is not widespread. Consequently,
under the proposed standard, many foreign firms auditing SEC registrants may
have to engage an independent practitioner to assess and report on their
compliance with these requirements. Some believe that imposing such a
requirement on foreign firms, who may not have many SEC-registrant clients,
would be burdensome. Should the standard make an exception to the peer
review requirement for non-U.S. firms? Why or why not?
Q3.
Are there other safeguards that would be effective in protecting
independence when audit firm professionals go to work for an audit client? If
so, please describe these safeguards.

Q4. The proposed standard calls for full settlement of all capital accounts
when former firm partners join audit clients, regardless of the amount of time
that has elapsed since their departure from the firm. The standard also
requires settlement of retirement balances in these situations when the benefits
are not both de minimus to the firm, and fixed as to amount and timing of
payment. In addition, retirement benefits must also be settled when a partner
joins an audit client within two years of leaving the firm.
When a firm professional other than a partner leaves to join a firm audit client,
the proposed standard calls for settlement of all retirement balances and other
financial interests that are not both de minimus to the firm, and fixed as to
amount and timing of payment. In addition, the firm must also consider
whether retirement benefits and other financial interests should be settled
when a former firm professional (non-partner) joins an audit client within two
years of leaving the firm, based on the position that the professional has
accepted at the client.
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Are the distinctions in the proposed standard between the treatment of capital
accounts and retirement benefits appropriate? If not, why not? Are the
distinctions between the treatment of professionals that have joined audit
clients within two years of their departure from the firm, and those that join
clients subsequently appropriate? If not, why not? Are the distinctions
between the treatment of former firm partners and other professionals
appropriate? If not, why not?

Q5.

Is the proposed effective date of the standard appropriate? If not, why?
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